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But apart from mathematics (perhaps) and politics and theology (of course), there isn't very much Rationalism about now. People are more and more inclined to accept a superficial view of things. And some people are even prepared to go out of their way to look at things instead of sitting back and thinking them out.

Except in æsthetics. The destructive Mr. Pound may say: "The proper method of studying poetry and good letters is the method of contemporary biologists, that is careful first hand examination of the matter and continual comparison of one 'slide' or specimen with another. . . . By this method modern science has arisen, not on the narrow edge of mediæval logic suspended in a vacuum."

But in æsthetics people are still bemused by the fancies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. They still believe that the particular lines, curves, surfaces, colours and so on of a work of art are of little importance because "its function is to unveil an inward or ideal vitality, emotion, soul, a content and mind". And that is why most talk about "art" is still an excuse for edification.

"An art gallery", says His Excellency Lord Bledisloe, late Governor-General of New Zealand, "which does not draw within its walls the general intelligent public of all classes of the community through the consciousness that it echoes its highest natural aspirations and supplies the ethical and spiritual pabulum for which its soul ardently craves, fails to justify public support."

UNIVERSITY REFORM.

By JOHN ANDERSON.

REFORM of the University will be differently understood according as one starts from a commercial or from an academic point of view, and further differences will be occasioned by the acceptance of a solidarist or a pluralist view of society. It would appear, however, that even those who hold that the question is to be settled in terms of the University's "ultimate value to the community", will require in the first instance to take account of the actual character of its work, and of its position as a special kind of social institution; they will have to consider the nature and conditions of *academic* activity or, at the very least, of "research". And even the most bigoted solidarist will hardly deny that institutions for "the higher learning" have a history of their own and that, however they have interacted with other institutions, their development has been conditioned by an independent interest in investigation and has not been brought about by successive decisions of "society".

It is to be understood, of course, that the interest in investigation is not confined to Universities, and, at the same time, that it does not function unhindered within them. But this merely means that, for those who are devoted to inquiry, University reform will consist in the strengthening of the forces of inquiry within the University and their closer alliance with similar forces outside, and that projected "reforms" in any other direction are in reality reactionary. The point to be emphasised is that the adoption of either the solidarist or the commercialist position (and the two soon run together) can neither account for the origin of the spirit of investigation nor guarantee its continuance; subordinated to "welfare" or to profit, science perishes. Certainly, the "results" of investigation can be of great commercial value; certainly, the problems of industry can give an impetus to inquiry. But, unless the independent scientific spirit exists, such interrelations cannot continue—and, incidentally, in such a case industry itself will decline.

The first condition of the maintenance and strengthening of the academic spirit is publicity. This means not merely that the public should have information on University activities, but that the academic or cultural point of view should be propagated

among the public. It is the business of academic investigators to speak out on behalf of their way of living and not, as is so often done, to apologise for it on the ground that after all it is of some assistance to non-academic enterprises. In this way they would not only arouse the cultural attitude in places where it is not at present active but would establish relations of solidarity with extra-academic investigators. They would aim, of course, not merely at enlisting formal support for culture but at carrying culture beyond the University. As far as present efforts in this direction are concerned, they have no more than an edifying, sermonistic effect; what is wanted is the encouragement of independent investigators, the organising of groups of serious students, and (what all this involves) an active intervention in public affairs.

Even in a matter so closely, indeed essentially, related to University work as school education it is remarkable how unwilling University workers are to express themselves publicly on the subject, how strong a tendency they have to make it a matter of private conferences or even merely to accept the accomplished fact. It may be urged that an individual teacher is naturally unwilling to pose as the spokesman of the academic point of view; but it may be answered at once that unless academic workers are prepared to state what they *think* is the academic point of view, the academic point of view will never be stated. The notion that the interests of investigation can be served by official machinery, guarded by a "hush-hush" policy instead of being ventilated by open discussion and criticism, is one that will not stand examination for a moment.

Clearly, the public propagation of the academic attitude will involve not merely support of certain extra-academic activities but also opposition to others—if only because of the strength of the anti-cultural tendencies in existing commercial society. The necessity of this opposition is very little recognised by University workers. Ignorant journalists and business men may make a cockshy of the University, but University men do not retaliate or, for the most part, even defend themselves. The academic view of the Press and of contemporary commerce could well be expressed in such terms as would shake up these vested interests, some of their more corrupt proceedings could easily be exposed by research workers—as apparently happens from time to time in the United States—but the University workers of the British Empire, at least, seem to "know their place" too well to engage in any such vulgar controversies. It is unnecessary to enter here into the reasons for this state of affairs. But clearly what is needed first and foremost in the way of University reform is something that will stiffen the backs of academic workers, that will strengthen the academic forces within the University and make it function more actively

in an academic way. It should not need further demonstration that, whatever may be the "privacy" required for research, the academic life as such is not a secluded one, in the sense of being apart from social struggle. If it were, then, in these times, it could only perish.

For the reinforcing of the academic character of the University it is, of course, essential that the entrance standard should be maintained. The insistence on an entrance qualification which will be a guarantee of genuine cultural attainments, involves opposition to "reform" along any of the lines currently suggested; e.g. the provision of options in line with "up-to-date" (*i.e.* business) requirements, the acceptance of school-masters' recommendations, or the substitution of "tests" for examinations in which candidates have to show an ability to *discuss*—for it is above all in consecutive discussion that the possession of a cultural background can appear. With this is connected the serious question of the multiplication of Faculties. Here it may be contended that to bring within the University studies which are generally pursued in technical colleges of one kind or another, is to ensure that a high scientific standard will be maintained in investigations in these departments; it may incidentally be argued that the first three years' work in such courses as those in Agriculture and Veterinary Science in Sydney University is substantially equivalent to that required for a B.Sc. degree. Nevertheless, there is much to be said for the view that the standard in all "technical" faculties would be improved if all students had to begin by taking a degree in Arts or Pure Science; and it may be added that it would operate strongly for the advancement of science if Science students had a more thorough cultural training. At any rate, it is worth noting that it is especially in connection with the more "practical" Faculties that attempts are made to lower the entrance standard. The strengthening of the academic forces in the University, then, involves the renewed recognition of the central position of Arts and Pure Science, as well as the desirability of a closer correlation between the two; and it involves, in Sydney, the restoration of the authority of the Faculty of Arts in regard to conditions of entrance.

A further important requirement for the keeping up of academic standards is an increased measure of control of Universities by those who work in them. Indeed, it may be said that, until Universities are run by University staffs (with the delegation of a share of responsibility for the conduct of their studies to the students themselves), they will never be notably academic. This, of course, would involve a tremendous alteration not merely in present forms of organisation but in present attitudes. It is remarkable that, though the governing bodies of most Universities are obviously ill-equipped for the

management of educational activities, educational workers in their employment show the greatest reluctance to criticise their actions and policy, and especially to do it publicly. How this "employee" complex can be thrown off it is not easy to see; but, at any rate, academic progress, if it does come about, will go hand in hand with the assertion by educational workers of their greater knowledge of the requirements of an educational institution than is possessed by the members of the legal, medical and other professions who are now in control. (Here, again, disunion and confusion of outlook are fostered among the staff by the multiplication of Faculties.) One sign of a more vigorous attitude on the part of University teachers would be the adoption, by those of their number who sit on the governing body, of the policy of full discussion with their colleagues of the transactions of that body. Considerations of "propriety" have little compatibility with a serious struggle for specific objects; and such considerations would soon cease to have weight, if University teachers became thoroughly convinced of the need for academic autonomy. The main force which may stimulate such a conviction is the growing invasion of the Universities, and concurrent undermining of their authority, by business interests.

It is in connection with the question of University government that the proposals put forward by the officials of the recently formed Sydney University Graduates' Association are most strikingly reactionary. The suggestion that the present small representation of the staff on the governing body should actually be reduced is thoroughly in accordance with the desire to have a businesslike University (in which a clear line would be drawn between directors and employees), and it is not surprising that these reformers pursue their aims with the professed motive of "service", which is the regular justification for every form of social interference. It is true that graduates *could* serve the University; they could do so by securing public support for the claims of academic independence, for the control of academic institutions by academic persons, in short, for the *democratic* working of these institutions. Indeed, with greater academic freedom, an increasing number of graduates would take this line. But, as it is, the generality of graduates have little understanding of either democracy or the academic life, and the above-mentioned proposal of a greater measure of external control is an illustration of this fact.

It may be urged that it is a reproach to Universities if their graduates do not adopt a cultural outlook, and that this shows that some reform is urgently required. Undoubtedly that is so, but, as has been suggested, it is connected with the weakness of Universities on the academic side and cannot be corrected by a further weakening in that direction. In particular, it is

not to be expected that the products of the narrower professional schools would exhibit much interest in culture. But, even under the best of conditions, the mere possession of a degree would not be a guarantee of culture or, incidentally, of an understanding of how a University should be run. The question is not of the receipt of so much culture, which may then be retained as a possession, but of *ways of living*. Even in passing through the University a student does not necessarily become deeply immersed in the academic way of life; for the most part he has his professional prospects in view, and he remains apart from the permanent work of investigation, with which training for the professions is more or less harmoniously conjoined, but which no one will deny is an essential part of the University's activity. On the other hand, when he leaves the University, he does become immersed in a professional or commercial way of life, and may easily lose any sympathy he ever had with the academic life. Thus the notion that a graduate is fitted by his degree to contribute fruitfully to the working of the University is an entirely false one. It is well known that graduates' associations, particularly in the United States, have actively assisted in the commercialising of University life, and the same attitude appears in the Sydney proposals. The complaint that employers in general look askance at graduates is quite beside the point. There is little doubt that the main reason for this suspicious attitude is just that employers in general are opposed to freedom and grudge the University such freedom as it retains. And the notion that the University should alter its way of working in order to meet such complaints and suspicions is simply grotesque. As has been said, graduates in their professions and organisations and social life generally, could do something to propagate culture and stimulate recognition of the claims of the academic life; any graduates who do so may reasonably expect sympathetic cooperation from academic workers. But those who demand a hearing merely on the ground that they are graduates, are thereby showing their *lack* of culture.

Some remarks may be made here on the lecture system, on which a number of ill-considered criticisms have been passed. Obviously there can be good lectures and bad lectures—but it would be foolish to imagine that any system could be devised which would rule out the possibility of bad work. Tutorials and seminars could also be badly conducted, and there is nothing to show that they are bound to stimulate the student to more active thinking. Indeed, one might suggest that the demand for tutorials springs rather from the desire for an extended and more effective "spoon-feeding". If students think over the lecture-material for themselves and discuss it with one another, they will make more progress than if they are continually running to the staff for further explanations. The printing of lectures

would not meet the situation at all; the question is of the gradual unfolding of a position and the growing understanding of it on the part of students—an understanding which is, of course, assisted by the working of class exercises, but which does not in any case keep exact step with the lectures, as if one should say, "I have grasped that; what is the next step?" A further misunderstanding of the process of learning is shown in the contention that students cannot be intelligently taking in the material if they are writing all the time. Anyone with any experience of public lecturing knows how little is taken away by those who simply sit and display an "intelligent interest", and how greatly understanding is enhanced by the practice of note-taking; he knows also how little intelligence there is in most of the questions asked "on the spot". There is no denying that improvement in many degree courses could be wrought, for example, by a reduction in the number of subjects to be taken, by an increase in the staff to meet the requirements of "practical work", and by the provision of definite channels whereby students could express their criticisms of the courses they attend—such increased freedom for students being something that would naturally develop along with academic freedom in general. But lectures, whether in the form of presentation of unpublished material, criticism of published works, or simply the consecutive treatment of leading questions with which all students of the subject must come to terms, will always remain the central feature of any course of higher study.

There will, of course, be all the greater a tendency for students to think for themselves, if it is recognised that the University is not just a collection of professional training schools and, consequently, that the provision of lecture-courses is only one part of its work. The character of the University as an institution for learning will never receive due recognition, until those who are devoted to learning are prepared to uphold it as an independent social force, and to engage in a struggle *against* commercialism. Naturally, the representatives of academic autonomy will have to come to various arrangements with other social forces, but they will always get the worst of the bargain unless they make their independence a condition of the arrangements. This applies particularly to arrangements with the State. The University can demand State support on the ground that it does prepare for the professions and that it alone, precisely because of its disinterested approach to the questions involved, can do so efficiently. It follows, however, that it cannot accept State control of the administration of funds supplied by the State, or any State interference in its policy. The forces which go by the name of "the State" do not understand the conditions necessary for the maintenance of academic standards, and have a definitely commercialist bias. Current

proposals for examination "reform", for the establishment of country colleges, and the like, illustrate these facts, and show the necessity for a consistent academic resistance to all attempts to *cheapen* education—which is the essence of the commercialist outlook. Only an aggressive policy can enable the University to maintain its standards in these times; and such a policy, with the greater academic freedom which it would entail, would stimulate the support of graduates instead of allowing them to drift easily into the commercialist camp.

The question of the University's attitude to the State is closely connected with the question of patriotism. It will naturally follow from the above considerations that the University cannot be officially patriotic or, at least, that, where it is so, it is departing from the academic point of view. In any department of Political Science, as well as in departments of cognate studies, patriotic and anti-patriotic views will be considered, and certain conclusions arrived at as to the working of patriotic sentiments in political affairs. But in an institution in which investigation is paramount, patriotism must be regarded as subject to investigation and criticism, and allegiance cannot be owed to institutions in which investigation is *not* paramount. The same applies to all questions of acute social controversy. In a developed University, Marxist and anti-Marxist views, religious and anti-religious views, the theories of Freud and theories opposed to Freud, will be thoroughly gone into, and the outcries of excited business men or anxious parents will be vigorously and not apologetically met. This means, as already indicated, that the upholders of investigation cannot keep their work entirely within the confines of a single institution but inevitably become involved in public controversies. In particular, they are forced to interest themselves in the whole educational system, and to support freedom of investigation in the schools as well as in the University. And, in general, their opposition to the subjection of the University to business interests carries over into every department of social life. It is an interesting fact, in this connection, that no considerable academic opposition to governmental censorship has hitherto been aroused; but what it indicates is the comparative weakness of the academic interest, the spirit of investigation, in the Universities themselves.

It should always be remembered that culture is opposed not to commerce but to commercialism; the question is whether or not investigation is to be subordinated to the making of profits. As previously suggested, there is not only no opposition between science and industry, but the two are of the greatest assistance to one another. It was in Ionia as a centre of commerce that science first developed, and it is in the more industrially advanced countries that it still holds the leading place. But the mutual assistance between the two forms of activity depends on investi-

gation not being subordinated to "utilitarian" requirements. Indeed, the further development of industry at the present time depends on the passage from the standpoint of the consumer to that of the producer, from the disorganisation occasioned by profit-seeking to the re-organisation consequent on socialisation. The attempt to impose a utilitarian outlook on the University is thus in line with the degeneration of present-day industry as indicated by unemployment, crisis and war. And, on the other hand, the upholding of academic standards is in line with the regeneration of industry by the productive forces which socialisation will release.

It is not the object of this article to work out in detail the position here outlined. The point of immediate importance is that the academic forces are confronted by the forces of commercialism, and that the struggle against the latter can be conducted effectively only if the upholders of investigation take account of the general condition of society, the state of social forces and the direction of their movements. It is not enough that they should simply investigate; for the carrying out of investigation, the establishment of investigation as a way of life, depends on social conditions and involves relations of assistance and resistance to other forms of activity. And, of course, it is just because they are subjected to these opposing forces, because not merely the institutions they work in but they themselves carry the opposition within them, that investigators lose sight of the issues and have to be awakened, if investigation is to continue, to the dangers confronting them. But social orientation is precisely one of the conditions of culture; and thus we have another argument against narrow specialist training and in favour of the dissemination of culture, in the sense of a general grasp of the scientific, artistic and social activities of mankind, and the direction of one's own work in relation to these. The advancement of such culture, and that alone, is what can be seriously meant by University reform.

DISCUSSION.

THE LOGIC OF RELATIVITY.

By HERBERT C. CORBEN.

IN an article recently published in this Journal⁽¹⁾ Mr. C. C. Allen condemns the principles of the theory of Relativity as unsound, non-existent, unnecessary, untrue, and meaningless, claiming "in short, that relativity is a delusion". Whilst not presuming to write a defence of Relativity, for the theory is defended by its own successes, I should like to point out one or two misconceptions in Mr. Allen's paper.

In the first place it is said that "in his book on Relativity, Einstein does not make reference to even one single observation. The whole of his reasoning is based on purely imaginary happenings." In Chapters XIII and XVI of this book,⁽²⁾ however, are mentioned four experiments, by means of which it has become possible to decide between the theories of Newton and Einstein, in favour of the latter. Two of these—experiments on aberration and on cathode rays—are only mentioned, but the other two are fully described. I refer to Fizeau's experiment and the justly famous Michelson-Morley experiment, without which Relativity would certainly be the delusion that Mr. Allen considers it now.

Secondly, Einstein's assertion of the equivalence of gravitational and centrifugal forces is criticised on the ground that "centrifugal force always acts outwards from the centre of rotation, while a gravitational field always exerts an attraction inwards towards the centre of mass", a fact which Einstein himself is careful to point out.⁽³⁾ Einstein is not asserting the equivalence between the space distribution of the fields, but only between their effects at any particular point. He is identifying the forces themselves and not the way in which the magnitudes of these forces change as we move from point to point. He is saying that, if we were to experience a force of, say, ten pounds weight in a certain direction, we would not be able to find out, from the nature of the force itself, whether it were caused by gravity or by rotation.

On page 12 of his book, Einstein considers a raven flying in the air uniformly and in a straight line and viewed by two observers, one in a moving train, and the other on an embankment under which the train is passing. This illustration is criticised on the grounds (a) that the raven may be flying with zero velocity with respect to the train; (b) that the magnitude and direction of the raven's velocity are different for different observers. The former is merely a limiting case, included in